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TITLE IX AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: NORTH
HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments in
response to widespread sex discrimination by educational institutions.'
The goal of the statute was to prevent the use of federal funds to support
discriminatory practices by institutions of higher education.2 In 1975, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) issued regulations
pursuant to sections 901 and 902 of Title IX.3 These regulations were
specifically directed at the employment practices of federally funded edu-
cation programs.
In the recent case of North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,4 the
United States Supreme Court held that employment discrimination is
within the scope of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.' The
Court also held the Subpart E regulations," promulgated by HEW pursu-
ant to Title IX, valid.7 In doing so, the Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, departing from the
holdings of five other courts of appeals8 and various district courts.9
1. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearing on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before a Special
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970).
2. Id.
3. Section 901(a) provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex,. . . be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Section 902 provides in pertinent part
that agencies authorized to extend federal financial assistance shall issue regulations neces-
sary for the enforcement of § 901, that compliance with § 901 may be achieved by the termi-
nation of or refusal to grant or continue to provide federal funds, or by any means author-
ized by law. See North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1914 (1982).
4. 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
5. 20 U.S.C. 88 1681-85 (1976).
6. 34 C.F.R. 88 106.51-.61 (1980). The regulations were initially issued by HEW in 45
C.F.R. §§ 86.1-.71 (1979). On May 4, 1980, the Department of Education assumed the re-
sponsibility of enforcing Title IX and its regulations. In the interest of consistency, however,
this comment will continue to refer to HEW as the enforcing agency.
7. 102 S. Ct. at 1927.
8. See, e.g., Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), va-
cated, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d
424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
9. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Kneeland v.
Bloom Township High School Dist. No. 206, 484 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1980); University
of Toledo v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1979); McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F.
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These courts had uniformly held HEW's regulations invalid and unen-
forceable because they exceeded the authority granted by Title IX.
This comment focuses upon the approach of the Supreme Court in
resolving the scope of Title IX and the propriety of HEW's regulations
issued pursuant to it. The superiority of the reasoning underlying the Su-
preme Court's conclusion, as compared to that of the lower courts, is em-
phasized. To establish the historical background which ultimately led to
the Supreme Court's resolution, the development of the issues in the
lower courts is first explored.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISSUE IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
The scope of Title IX was first addressed in a federal appellate court in
1979 by the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee v. Califano.10 In
this case HEW declared Islesboro's maternity leave policies violative of
one of the agency's regulations1' because the school committee treated
pregnancy differently from other temporary disabilities. Threatened with
termination of its federal funds, Islesboro sought and obtained an injunc-
tion against HEW's enforcement measures. The court also declared that
HEW's regulations were promulgated in excess of the authority conferred
upon it by Title IX and thus were invalid and unenforceable. Affirming
the lower court's decision, the First Circuit examined the language of sec-
tions 901 and 902 of Title IX1 and concluded that the goal of the statute
was to protect the beneficiaries of federal assistance. These beneficiaries
were identified as students participating in the programs or teachers in-
volved in federally funded research.'3 Looking at the exceptions set forth
in section 902, the court determined that because these exceptions dealt
only with student admissions or activities, Congress did not intend to in-
clude employment in section 901's general proscription of sex discrimina-
tion.' 4 Finding no express exclusion of employment in the language of the
statute, the court then examined the statute's legislative history. The
court found the various discussions of employment within the legislative
history to be identifiable exclusively with the proposed amendments to
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act'5 and the Equal Pay Act.'6 Conse-
quently, the court refused to view any of the references to employment as
Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978).
10. 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979) (complainant alleged that the school district employing
her discriminated in their maternity leave policies).
11. 45 C.F.R. § 86.57(c) (requiring a recipient of federal funds to treat pregnancy or any
resulting disability as any other temporary disability for all job-related purposes).
12. See supra note 3.
13. Islesboro, 593 F.2d at 426.
14. See supra note 3.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976).
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indicators of a Title IX proscription of employment discrimination. 17 Ad-
ditionally, the First Circuit rejected the argument that Congress' failure
to include a clause specifically excluding employment18 reflected an intent
to include employment practices under Title IX. The court justified the
absence of such an exclusionary clause by asserting that it would have
created an inconsistency with other portions of the same bill.,,
In Junior College District of St. Louis v. Califano,20 the Eighth Circuit,
relying heavily upon the Islesboro opinion, held that Title IX did not
cover employment practices. As in Islesboro, the Eighth Circuit deter-
mined that neither the "plain language" of the statute nor the legislative
history revealed a congressional intent to prohibit sex discrimination in
education-related employment under Title IX.
21
Two weeks after the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Sixth Circuit held in
Romeo Community Schools v. HEW2 that sections 901 and 902 of Title
IX applied solely to students in federally assisted programs and activities,
not to employees of educational institutions receiving federal funds.
Again the court sought to interpret the language and legislative intent of
the statute. In rejecting HEW's argument that the broadest possible des-
ignation of beneficiaries"3 was intended by Congress' use of the word
"person" in section 901,4 the court called this interpretation "strained."25
The court further noted that the term "person" was modified by subse-
quent language which clearly limited its meaning to students. Another
reason underlying the court's holding was the lack of employment-related
exceptions in section 902.28
17. Islesboro, 593 F.2d at 426.28.
18. Id. at 428. HEW argued that if Congress had wanted to exclude employment it could
have done so expressly through a clause similar to § 604 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 which reads: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize
action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any employment
practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3
(1976).
19. Islesboro, 593 F.2d at 428. See proposed amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act, supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
20. 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979) (complaint alleged discrimination on the basis of her sex
regarding the salary she received).
21. Id. at 121.
22. 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979) (complainant alleged gender-based discrimination in the
school board's treatment of pregnancy in its collective bargaining agreements).
23. HEW argued that "teachers and counselors, as well as students, are 'persons' who
participate in and benefit from federally assisted programs and are vulnerable to discrimina-
tion under such programs." Id. at 583.
24. See supra note 3.
25. Romeo, 600 F.2d at 584.
26. Id. at 583-84. The court stated that "exceptions deal with the same subject matter as
that covered generally by the preceding language" and concluded that since the exceptions
in § 902 did not relate to employment, it was not the subject of § 901. Id. at 584.
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The court also gave great weight to the fact that Title IX was part of a
legislative package aimed at eliminating discrimination against women in
the education field. Two preexisting laws, Title VIP 7 and the Equal Pay
Act,2" were amended by another section of this package to prohibit the
subjection of educational employees to sex discrimination.29 The court as-
serted that a disclaimer clause specifically excluding employment from
Title IX's coverage would have created an inconsistency within the pack-
age.30 The Sixth Circuit also addressed the issue of the remedial sanction
available to HEW under its regulations. Disapprovingly, the court noted
that the single sanction of fund termination penalized students. Such a
penalty was justifiable in the court's eyes only as a means of preventing
or ending student discrimination and not for "enforcing individual rights
of teachers and other school employees. 3 1 Comparing the harshness of
HEW's Title IX remedy with the direct and superior remedies for sex
discrimination provided in other portions of the same bill, the court con-
cluded that Congress did not intend for Title IX to cover discriminatory
employment practices.32 Finally, in its examination of the legislative re-
cord, the court pointed to a "breakdown" made by the sponsor, Senator
Birch Bayh, in which he purportedly treated sex discrimination in feder-
ally funded programs as a separate issue from the prohibition against dis-
crimination in educational employment.3 3
In Seattle University v. HEW, 4 the Ninth Circuit, following the lead
of three other circuit courts, found that neither the language of Title IX
nor its legislative history reflected an intent by Congress to cover sex dis-
crimination in employment.3 5
Taking a somewhat different approach, the Fifth Circuit in Dougherty
County School System v. Harris,3 6 invalidated HEW's regulations on the
27. See supra note 15.
28. See supra note 16.
29. Romeo, 600 F.2d at 584. Section 906 of Pub. L. No. 92-318 brought employees of
schools engaged in educational activities within the coverage of Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act.
30. Romeo, 600 F.2d at 584.
31. Id. But see United States v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 882-86 (5th Cir.
1966) (racial discrimination against faculty members perpetrated racial discrimination
against students because a school could not be completely desegregated with a segregated
faculty; students have a right to be free from racial discrimination in the form of a segre-
gated faculty). See also Board of Pub. Instr. v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969)
(where federal funds support a program "so affected by discriminatory practices elsewhere
in the school system that [the program] thereby becomes discriminatory" against students,
fund termination is appropriate). Id. at 1079.
32. Romeo, 600 F.2d at 584.
33. Id. at 585.
34. 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (HEW charged the university with discrimination in the
award of salaries), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982).
35. Seattle, 621 F.2d at 993.
36. 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980) (female economics teacher complained she was paid less
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grounds they lacked the program-specificity required by Title IX. The
court noted that the enforcing agency had exceeded its authority by en-
acting regulations prohibiting sex discrimination in employment without
limiting their effect to the specific programs that receive federal financial
assistance.3 7 Unlike the First, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, this court
upheld HEW's authority to promulgate regulations governing employ-
ment practices, but stated that such regulations had to be limited in
scope to those programs staffed by a faculty paid with federal funds.38
To summarize, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit, all of the federal
appellate courts which addressed this issue prior to North Haven uni-
formly held that employment practices of educational institutions are
outside the scope of Title IX. All of these circuit courts, including the
Fifth Circuit, held the regulations promulgated by HEW invalid and
unenforceable.
The Second Circuit in North Haven Board of Education v. Huf-
stedler9 completely departed from the reasoning of the other circuit
courts and unanimously held that HEW's regulations did not exceed the
statutory grant of authority. The court relied heavily on its interpretation
of the legislative history of Title IX.40 The failure of Congress to provide
a clause excluding employment was deemed convincing evidence of a leg-
islative intent that Title IX cover employment. 41 The court also viewed
the sponsoring remarks of Senator Bayh as revealing an intention that
the statute apply to employment practices.42
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION IN NORTH HAVEN
In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell"5 the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the Second Circuit's decision in North Haven Board
of Education v. Hufstedler. For the first time the Supreme Court ad-
dressed this much debated issue, declaring that employment was within
than male teachers in the same program), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982);
37. Dougherty, 622 F.2d at 738. See infra text accompanying notes 75-85.
38. Dougherty, 622 F.2d at 738.
39. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980). This case involved two disputes consolidated on appeal:
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Califano, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1505 (D. Conn.
1979) and Trumbull Bd. of Educ. v. HEW, No. B78-401 (D. Conn. May 24, 1979). In North
Haven a female tenured teacher was denied reemployment following maternity leave, and in
Turnbull a female guidance counselor complained of being subjected to sexual discrimina-
tion with respect to working conditions, job assignments and contract renewal. The district
court in both cases held HEW's regulations proscribing gender-based discrimination by fed-
erally funded educational institutions invalid and unenforceable.
40. North Haven, 629 F.2d at 778-84.
41. Id. at 783.
42. Id. at 779-81. "This portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas
where abuse has been mentioned--employment practices for faculty and administra-
tors. . . ." Id. at 780.
43. 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982), aff'g 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the scope of Title IX and that HEW's Subpart E regulations were valid
and enforceable. 44 Using a three-pronged inquiry, the Court sought to dis-
cern the legislative intent behind the statute to the greatest certainty pos-
sible. In its attempt to determine the scope of Title IX, the Court looked
first to the statutory language, then examined the legislative history of
the statute. The Court also considered Congress' subsequent treatment of
Title IX. Regarding the propriety of HEW's regulations, the Court con-
sidered both the absence of Congressional disapproval subsequent to a
required review of agency regulations and the compliance of the regula-
tions with the program-specificity requirements of Title IX.45
A. Three-Pronged Inquiry Into Legislative Intent
1. Statutory Language
In examining the language of Title IX, the Court emphasized the sig-
nificance of Congress' use of a broad directive against sex discrimination.
Focusing upon the language of section 901(a) that "no person" may be
discriminated against on the basis of their sex, the Court noted that, on
its face, the statute included employees as well as students.4 The Court
deemed this broad directive to encompass employees paid from federal
funds as well as those participating in a federally funded program. This
approach to the language of the statute was summarized by the Court,
stating that "if we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins dictate,
we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.' 4
In further examination of the statutory language, the Court addressed
the petitioning school board's argument concerning the nine exceptions to
section 901's coverage. 48 Petitioners argued that because these exemp-
tions were directed solely at student related matters, section 901 must
cover only students.49 In response to this argument, however, the Court
44. In addressing the arguments of petitioners (the North Haven Board of Education),
the Supreme Court effectively refuted all of the major premises upon which the First, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits had based their holdings.
45. See infra notes 68-71, 85-86 and accompanying text.
46. North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 1917 (1982).
47. Id. at 1917-18 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
48. North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1918. These exceptions were set forth in §§ 901(a)(1)-(9).
Specifically exempted from Title IX's proscription of sex discrimination are schools that
initiate a change to become coeducational for the first time, § 901(a)(2); schools of a reli-
gious organization with contrary religious tenents, § 901(a)(3); military training institutions,
§ 901(a)(4); public undergraduate institutions that have traditionally and continually admit-
ted students of only one sex, § 901(a)(5); social fraternities or sororities or voluntary service
clubs, § 901(a)(6); boy or girl scout conferences, § 901(a)(7); father-son and mother-daughter
activities at schools, § 901(a)(8); and higher education institutions awarding "beauty" pag-
eant scholarships, § 901(a)(9). 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
49. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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noted that two of the exceptions, namely section 901(a)(3) 50 and section
901(a)(4), 51 exempted entire classes of institutions and thus were not lim-
ited to student-related matters. The Court further noted that the absence
of any employment-related exemption supported the conclusion that Ti-
tle IX's protection extends to employees. 52
2. Legislative History
Because the language of Title IX did not expressly include employees,
the Supreme Court turned to the Act's legislative history. Relying heavily
upon the comments of the amendment's sponsor, Senator Bayh, 53 the
Court concluded that the congressional objective behind sections 901 and
902 of Title IX was to prohibit discriminatory employment practices in
federally assisted educational programs.5 The Court found that Senator
Bayh's reference to section 901(a) as the "heart" of his amendment illus-
trated that this section as well as Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were
aimed at employment discrimination. 55 To further refute petitioners' ar-
gument that references to employment were made exclusively in the con-
text of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, the Court again quoted Senator
Bayh. The Court emphasized the Senator's inclusion of "employment
practices for faculty and administrators" among the areas of discrimina-
tion at which the amendment was aimed.56 While conceding that a spon-
soring legislator's remarks are not controlling, the Court deemed Bayh's
remarks an "authoritative guide to the statute's construction."' 7 The
Court additionally noted that these remarks were made on the same day
as the amendment was passed and were prepared rather than spontane-
50. See supra note 48.
51. Id.
52. North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1918.
53. Summarizing this proposal Senator Bayh stated:
Amendment No. 874 is broad, but basically it closes loopholes in existing legis-
lation relating to general education programs and employment resulting from
those programs .... [Tihe heart of this amendment is a provision banning
sex discrimination in educational programs receiving Federal funds. The
amendment would cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures, schol-
arships, and faculty employment, with limited exceptions. Enforcement pow-
ers include fund termination provisions-and appropriate safeguards-parallel
to those found in title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Other important provi-
sions in the amendment would extend the equal employment opportunities
provisions of title VII for the 1964 Civil Rights Act to educational institutions,
and extend the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act to include executive, adminis-
trative and professional women.
118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (emphasis added), cited in 102 S. Ct. at 1919.
54. 102 S. Ct. at 1919-20.
55. Id. at 1919. See supra note 53.
56. Id. at 1920. See id. at 1919-20 n.14.
57. 102 S. Ct. at 1920-21.
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ous and were the only authoritative indications of congressional intent.58
Other evidence in the legislative record upon which the Supreme Court
based its decision was the refusal of Congress to include an exemption
clause excluding employment practices from Title IX. Pointing to Con-
gress' express choice to omit such a clause,60 and refusing to accept prior
judicial analysis of this omission,6' the Court concluded that Congress in-
tended for Title IX to cover employment practices.6 2 Noting the ease with
which Congress could have explained its omission of the exclusionary
clause as necessary to avoid an inconsistency with other portions of the
bill, the Court rejected the inconsistency argument.6' In addition, the
Court found little weight in the petitioners' argument that a specific ex-
clusion for employment was unnecessary. Petitioners based their argu-
ment upon the similarity between Title VI and Title IX, asserting that
Title VI was agreed not to cover employment even before the section6
specifically excluding that area was added. In response to this analogy the
Supreme Court stated that "although two statutes may be similar in lan-
guage and objective, we must not fail to give effect to the differences be-
tween them."6 5 The Court thus concluded that while Title VI explicitly
excluded employment discrimination from its coverage, Title IX did not,
and therefore employment was covered under Title IX.
In concluding its inquiry into the legislative history of Title IX, the
Supreme Court found corroboration of its statutory interpretation that
Title IX prohibited discriminatory employment practices.66
58. Id. at 1921.
59. The proposed exclusionary clause, section 1004 provided: "[N]othing in this title may
be taken to authorize action by any department or agency with respect to any employment
practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." H.R. REP. No. 554,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2462, 2566-67.
60. 102 S. Ct. at 1921. Although the House version of the amendment contained a clause
excluding employment similar to section 604 of Title VI, the final version passed by Con-
gress lacked such a clause.
61. See supra notes 18, 35 and accompanying text. The First, Sixth and Ninth Circuits
accepted petitioner's contention that § 1004 was deleted to avoid an inconsistency with
other portions of the bill, and not to make an affirmative statement that employment was to
be covered by Title IX.
62. 102 S. Ct. at 1921-22.
63. Id. See supra note 60.
64. See supra note 18.
65. 102 S. Ct. at 1922. More specifically, the Court stated that "[i]f Congress had in-
tended that Title IX have the same reach as Title VI, . . we assume that it would have
enacted counterparts to both § 601 and § 604." Id. For a more extensive discussion of the
Title IX and Title VI analogy, see generally Note, Title IX Does Not Apply to Faculty
Employment, 1981 DuE L.J. 566, 582-86.
66. 102 S. Ct. at 1922-23.
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3. Postenactment History
The Court's examination of the postenactment history of Title IX con-
firmed the conclusion that Congress, through this statute, sought to ban
education-related employment discrimination. The Court focused upon a
portion of the Congressional Record17 set forth after Title IX's enactment
in which Senator Bayh recognized the purposeful omission of an employ-
ment exemption from the general provisions of section 901. Next, the
Court pointed to the relative absence of a disapproving congressional re-
sponse to HEW's Subpart E regulations directed at employment prac-
tices, despite the formal opportunity to respond negatively.68 The Court
further noted Congress' refusal to pass bills69 amending section 901 to
limit its coverage of employment discrimination.
7 0
Acknowledging that postenactment developments do not carry the au-
thoritative weight of legislative history or statutory language, the Court
nevertheless found that such developments further supported its decision.
The Supreme Court viewed Congress' refusal to amend the statute to
limit its employment coverage and the absence of congressional disap-
proval of HEW's Subpart E regulations as "authoritative expressions" de-
fining the scope of Title IX.7 1
4. Summary of Inquiry Into Legislative Intent
The Supreme Court's examination of the language, legislative history
and postenactment treatment of Title IX far exceeded that of the First,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Focusing upon the same areas as
these circuit courts, the Supreme Court reached an opposing but more
efficiently reasoned conclusion. Regarding the language of Title IX, the
Supreme Court abided by the recognized canon of statutory construc-
tion7 2 which suggests that the words of a statute be given their literal
meaning as they are understood in everyday usage.73 The Court also used
a widely accepted method 7 4 of establishing a statute's purpose when it
67. Id. at 1923 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 24,684 n.1 (1972)).
68. 102 S. Ct. at 1923-24. Pursuant to 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (1974) (requiring an agency to
receive formal comments on regulations issued pursuant to its statutory authority) and 40
Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975) (requiring HEW to submit its regulations for congressional review),
Congress twice had the opportunity to review formally and respond to HEW's regulations
aimed at employment practices.
69. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc. 28,136 (1976); 121 CONG. REc. 23,845, 23,845-47 (1975).
70. 102 S. Ct. at 1925.
71. Id.
72. See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966).
73. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
74. 102 S. Ct. at 1923 n.21. See supra text accompanying notes 53-71. See also Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971); United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S.
405 (1962).
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used the legislative history and postenactment events as a guide in inter-
preting the language of Title IX. By deferring to HEW's interpretation
of its own regulations, the Court again followed a well-established course
of judicial review 5 with respect to the propriety of regulations promul-
gated by an agency.
B. The Program-Specificity Requirement
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the Second Cir-
cuit both as to Title IX's coverage of employment and the validity of
HEW's regulations, the Court noted that the Second Circuit failed to deal
sufficiently with a most significant aspect of the statute-program speci-
ficity. This issue represents perhaps the most crucial point in the Su-
preme Court's decision. The Court stressed that Title IX's provisions au-
thorizing fund termination"6 and regulation issuance, 77 as well as its
provision containing the general proscription of gender discrimination,7 8
all contain a program-specific limitation.7 9 The single point of contention
which the Supreme Court found with the Second Circuit opinion involves
the Second Circuit's failure to acknowledge that HEW's power to issue
regulations is limited to the same program-specificity as its enforcement
powers. Stating that "it makes little sense to interpret the statute ... to
authorize an agency to promulgate regulations that it cannot enforce,"'
the Supreme Court emphasized the need for clear judicial recognition of
the program-specific character of Title IX.8s
In addition to the limiting language of the statute itself, the Court
75. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1682(1) (1976).
77. 20 U.S.C. § '1682 (1976).
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 1926-27. In short, the program-specific limitation means that remedial
measures may only be taken with respect to the particular program in which sex discrimina-
tion is found and not to the entire institution.
80. Id. at 1926. See generally Salomone, North Haven and Dougherty & Narrowing the
Scope of Title IX, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 191 (1981) (discussing a "middle approach" to Title IX:
it covers employment but only as to faculty whose salaries are paid through federal funds).
81. It is significant to note that the Supreme Court in North Haven discussed the pro-
gram-specific nature of Title IX in a limited realm-the effect of the limitation on HEW's
power to issue regulations governing employment practices. Unlike those in the previous
federal court cases dealing with Title IX's program-specificity, see supra note 78, the peti-
tioners in North Haven did not object to the investigation for Title IX violations on the
grounds that the parties complaining of discrimination were not involved in an educational
program that received federal financial assistance or that the discrimination they suffered
did not affect a federally funded program. Rather, the petitioners in North Haven chal-
lenged HEW's authority to regulate any employment practices whatsoever. 102 S. Ct. at
1927-28. In other words, the Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether employment
was intended by Congress to be included under the terms "program" or "activity" in their
most general definition. Consequently, the Court never reached any questions of whether
any federal funds were received directly or not.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
found the legislative history to support the statute's program-specificity.
The Court cited both unsuccessful attempts in Congress to adopt propos-
als that generally would have prohibited discriminatory practices in fed-
erally funded institutions 2 and the sponsoring Senator Bayh's indication
that the amendment was program-specific.8 3 Finally, the Court pointed
out that the language of Title VI, virtually identical to that of Title IX,
had been interpreted as being program-specific. 8
4
Despite its contention with the Second Circuit's interpretation of
HEW's authority to issue regulations, the Supreme Court nonetheless af-
firmed the lower court by upholding HEW's Subpart E regulations. The
Court rejected the petitioners' claim that the regulations were invalid on
their face. In reference to HEW's regulations the Court stated:
Although their import is by no means unambiguous, we do not view
them as inconsistent with Title IX's program-specific character. The
employment regulations do speak in general terms of an educational
institution's employment practices, but they are limited by the provi-
sion that states their general purpose: "to effectuate title IX ... [,]
which is designed to eliminate (with certain exceptions) discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex in any education program or activity, receiv-
ing federal financial assistance. ..."85
In addition, the Court considered HEW's comments accompanying the
publication of its Subpart E regulations. It found them to support the
conclusion that the regulations complied with Title IX's program-specific-
ity requirement.88
IV. CONCLUSION
The split between the United States Supreme Court's decision and
those of the various circuit courts which had previously addressed the
issue reflects the inherent problem in judicial attempts to clarify the in-
tended scope of an ambiguously worded statute. The controversy over
whether Title IX prohibits sexually discriminatory employment practices
in educational institutions is an .important one. Sex discrimination in em-
ployment is occurring on a wide scale in the very institutions which Con-
82. 102 S. Ct. at 1926.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1926-27 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1980) (emphasis added)). But see Dough-
erty City School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980) (Title IX permits HEW to
regulate at least some unemployment practices but invalidated Subpart E regulations on the
ground that they did not apply to specific programs receiving federal financial assistance),
vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982).
86. 102 S. Ct. at 1927 (recognizing that its authority was limited, HEW stated that
"[flederal funds may be terminated.., upon a finding that they 'are infected by a discrimi-
natory environment. . . .'" Board of Pub. Instr. v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir.
1969); 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975), cited in 102 S. Ct. at 1927).
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gress sought to support with federal financial assistance through the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972.87 Of equal significance to the goal of
providing financial support through Title IX is Congress' desire to pre-
vent the use of those funds by institutions practicing sex discrimination.
To effectuate fully this intent, employees as well as students of federally
funded institutions must be afforded the protection of Title IX's prohibi-
tion. In the absence of congressional resolution of this heavily litigated
issue, the Supreme Court's holding in North Haven constitutes the most
appropriate way of ensuring that these congressional objectives will be
meaningfully fulfilled.
Of great significance for the future is the Supreme Court's stipulation
that the scope of Title IX's employment coverage is limited to specific
programs or activities actually receiving federal funds. The Court read a
program-specific limitation into the scope of Title IX as to its prohibition
of sex discrimination as well as to its enforcement power under which
HEW had promulgated regulations. Although the effect of the decision
was to extend Title IX's coverage to employment, it restricted the scope
of the statute by reading in a program-specific requirement. Inherent to
the Court's definition of program-specificity is the issue of what consti-
tutes the receipt of federal financial aid.
In University of Richmond v. Bell,"s the issue of funding was not before
the court; therefore, the court did not resolve the intended meaning of
Title IX's reference to an "education program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance."8 9 No test was set forth by the court to determine
when a program, although receiving no direct funds, still benefits from
federal aid, but the court did indicate that direct funding or funding
closely associated with the program would be necessary. 0
Certainly, such a vague standard regarding the program-specificity re-
quirement will lay the groundwork for future litigation. It is conceivable
that any attempt to impose Title IX's prohibition upon any aspect of an
educational institution not already recognized as subject to the statute
will have to focus upon this issue of direct and indirect funding. Given
the split which has already developed in the lower courts regarding this
question,"1 Supreme Court resolution of the issue will be difficult but nec-
87. See Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Post-
Secondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
466 passim (1975).
88. 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982). See supra note 80.
89. Id. at 326.
90. Id.
91. The Court's program-specific reading of Title IX in North Haven left the lower courts
with the question: Must a program receive federal funds which are "ear marked" for use by
that specific program in order for it to fall within the purview of the statute, or should the
program be subject to Title IX scrutiny if it "benefits" from federal funds received by other
programs or the institution generally? The federal courts addressing this question have gen-
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essary to the more consistent and effective implementation of an impor-
tant statute.
Claire G. Cardwell
erally been evenly split in their answers. For courts which have held that a direct funding
requirement should not be imposed as a prerequisite to Title IX jurisdiction, see Grove City
College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1982) (receipt by students of Basic Educational Oppor-
tunity Grant (BEOG) and Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) funds constitutes aid to the
institution, therefore the entire institution was subject to Title IX's prohibition of sex dis-
crimination); Haifer v. Temple University, 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), af'd, 688 F.2d
14 (3d Cir. 1982) (Because student financial aid from College Work Study (CWS), National
Direct Student Loan (NDSL), BEOG and GSL funds "enlarge the pool of student athletes
available [to the University], at least some of the federal funding going to Temple Univer-
sity is closely connected to the intercollegiate athletic program." Id. at 540); Wright v. Co-
lumbia University, 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (direct receipt of federal funds
earmarked for athletics not a prerequisite for Title IX jurisdiction). But see Rice v. Presi-
dent and Fellows of Harvard College, 636 F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1981) (CWS funds to law stu-
dents would not extend Title IX coverage to the law school in general but would only pre-
clude discrimination in the CWS program); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp.
321 (E.D. Va. 1982) (federal financial aid received through a Library Resources Grant,
Housing and Urban Development Loans and various student financial aid programs like
CWS, BEOG, NDSL and GSL did not extend jurisdiction under Title IX beyond those
programs); Bennett v. West Texas State University, 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (court
found that Congress indicated a clear intent that Title IX should apply only to specific
programs and activities which were receiving direct federal financial aid); Othen v. Ann Ar-
bor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("[T]he Act's provisions and require-
ments apply only to the specific class of educational programs or activities which receive
direct federal financial assistance." Id. at 1381 (emphasis added)).
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